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                           ____________ 
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                           ____________ 
 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
         In this case, a state prisoner alleges that he was 
denied parole in retaliation for the successful pursuit of relief 
in various federal habeas corpus proceedings.  The district court 
denied the petition on the merits and also found a failure to 
exhaust "administrative" remedies.  Because we conclude that 
petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies, and in addition, 
that some uncertainty exists as to the proper state procedure to 
address the issue that the prisoner raises, we remand with 
directions to dismiss.           
         Between February 1981 and April 1982, the district 
attorney of Blair County, Pennsylvania, filed three sets of 
charges against petitioner Wayne Burkett.  In November 1981, he 
was convicted of burglary, theft, receiving stolen property, and 
corruption of minors, docketed in 1981 at Nos. 140/141.  On 
January 20, 1982, Burkett was convicted of rape, involuntary 
deviate sexual intercourse, terroristic threats, unlawful 
restraint, indecent exposure, reckless endangerment, indecent 
assault, and aggravated assault, docketed in 1981 at No. 161.  A 
third conviction, entered on January 28, 1983 for attempted rape, 
terroristic threats, assault, and reckless endangerment was 
docketed in 1982 at No. 284.  
         In an earlier proceeding, we granted habeas corpus 
relief resulting in the vacation of the convictions at Nos. 
140/141 and 161 because of inordinate delays in sentencing.  SeeBurkett v. 
Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1987).  In Burkett 
v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431 (3d Cir. 1991), we held that the 
sentence imposed at No. 284 should be reduced because of delay.   
         After another round of orders from the district court 
and this Court, the state judge denied Burkett's motion for 
recusal and reduced the sentence in accordance with our earlier 
order.  Petitioner is presently serving a term of 12-3/4 to 28- 
3/4 years.  In February 1993, Burkett filed a Post Conviction 
Relief Act petition in Blair County challenging the sentence as 
excessive.     
         In September 1994, the Pennsylvania Parole Board denied 
petitioner's request for parole, citing, among other reasons, 
"very high assaultive behavior potential" and "unfavorable 
recommendation from district attorney and sentencing judge."   
         The Board rejected petitioner's request for 
reconsideration, stating:  "Be advised that what the Board 
decides and why, with regard to parole/reparole, is wholly within 
the Board's discretion and not subject to judicial review.  
Reider v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 514 A.2d 
967 (1986) (en banc)."   
         On September 28, 1994, Burkett filed a pro se habeas 
corpus petition in the Pennsylvania courts raising, among other 
claims, retaliatory denial of parole.  The state court dismissed 
the petition without prejudice and appointed new counsel with 
instructions to file an amended petition.   
         In June 1995, Burkett initiated the present matter by 
filing a document in the district court entitled "Motion to 
Enforce Order of the District Court Dated December 4, 1992 and to 
Permit Discovery in Support of Burkett's Motion."  (The December 
4, 1992 order had directed the imposition of a reduced sentence, 
as discussed in our opinion at 951 F.2d 1433.)  In this "motion," 
Burkett alleged that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had denied 
him parole in vindictive retaliation for his success in the 
earlier federal habeas corpus actions he had pressed in the 
district court and our Court.   
         The district court denied the motion, finding interalia that the 
decision to grant parole was committed to the sound 
discretion of the Parole Board and that the agency had cited at 
least five legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for its 
action.  Further, the court stated that the responses of the 
district attorney and the sentencing judge were proper and non- 
vindictive.  In addition, the court concluded that Burkett had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
         Burkett has appealed, contending that no corrective 
state process exists and therefore the district court should have 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and allowed discovery. 
 
                                I. 
                      Appellate Jurisdiction 
         Burkett's motion in the district court was filed under 
the docket number of an earlier case.  It should have been filed 
under a separate docket number rather than as a continuation of 
the previous action.  However, because the district court and the 
parties have treated this case as a new petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, we will do likewise.  The district court's order 
disposing of the matter is final as a practical matter and we 
have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
                               II. 
                   Exhaustion of State Remedies 
         State prisoners alleging a constitutional violation and 
improper incarceration must present their arguments to the state 
courts before they will be addressed by the federal courts.  28 
U.S.C.  2254(b).  At the time the "motion" was filed in the 
district court, 28 U.S.C.  2254(c) read:  "An applicant shall 
not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law of 
the State to raise, by any available procedure, the questions 
presented."   
         To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the claim must 
be presented to the state's highest court.  Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U.S. 509, 515 (1982).  "The exhaustion requirement does not 
foreclose, but only postpones, federal relief."  Toulson v. 
Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 986 (3d Cir. 1993).  Pursuing state remedies 
is not a mere formality, but serves the interests of comity 
between the state and federal courts.  Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 
805 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1986).   
         After this appeal was taken, Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), which revises the 
procedures for habeas corpus proceedings.  Section 104(1) of the 
Act states that applications by persons in state custody "shall 
not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the court of the State" or 
there is no available state remedy or that process would be 
ineffective.  However, a federal court may deny an application on 
the merits notwithstanding an applicant's failure to exhaust 
state remedies.  Id. 
         The 1996 statute also provides that if a state court 
has addressed the merits of a petitioner's claim, the federal 
court shall not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state 
decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 
federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding.  
Section 104(3).  Applicants have the burden to rebut a state's 
factual determinations by clear and convincing evidence.  Section 
104(4).  Section 104(4) also specifies the limited circumstances 
in which a federal court can hold an evidentiary hearing if the 
applicant has failed to develop the factual basis for a claim in 
the state proceeding.  In the somewhat unusual circumstances 
here, we need not digress to determine the effect of these 
provisions on this pending action, filed, as it was, before the 
amendments were enacted.   
                               III. 
             Does the State Lack Corrective Measures? 
         Burkett contends that retaliation for his exercise of 
access to the federal courts violates his rights under the United 
States Constitution, but that the state courts will not entertain 
his claim.  He points to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's in 
banc decision in Reider v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and 
Parole, 514 A.2d 967 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).   
         In that case, a state prisoner appealed to the 
Commonwealth Court alleging that the Parole Board's decision to 
deny him parole was a denial of his constitutional rights to 
equal protection as well as due process, and in addition 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  In an opinion 
dismissing the appeal, the Court reviewed a number of its earlier 
rulings that had reached differing results on its power to review 
Parole Board decisions asserted to have been in violation of the 
Constitution.   
         Because the Court's jurisdiction to review agency 
decisions rests on the administrative agency law of Pennsylvania, 
2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  701-704, which authorizes appeals from 
"adjudications," Reider looked to the statutory definition of 
that word.  The term "adjudication" excludes "any order based 
upon a proceeding . . . which involves . . . paroles."  2 Pa. 
Con. Stat. Ann.  101.  The Commonwealth Court concluded that 
"[b]y definition, therefore, Board action of denying parole is 
not an adjudication subject to judicial review."  Reider, 514 
A.2d. at 970. 
         The Reider opinion acknowledged that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Bronson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and 
Parole, 421 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 1980) had held that a prisoner could 
seek judicial review of a parole revocation.  In distinguishing 
Bronson, the Commonwealth Court cited Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), which 
concluded that a parole revocation affected a liberty interest 
because the ruling returned a parolee to custody.  In contrast, a 
prisoner denied parole is not at liberty but remains in custody 
and thus his status remains unchanged.   
         Following that reasoning, Reider held that under 
Pennsylvania law, a prisoner had "no constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in the expectation of being [paroled]."  514 
A.2d at 971.  "The mere possibility of parole affords no 
constitutional rights to prisoners."  Id. (emphasis in original).  
The Court, therefore, held that a denial of parole may not be 
judicially reviewed in Pennsylvania.  A dissenting Commonwealth 
Court judge pointed out that carrying his Court's holding to its 
logical extreme would allow the Board to refuse parole solely on 
the basis of a prisoner's  race, religion, gender, or ethnic 
background without any relief from the judiciary.  Id. at 972. 
         Later panel opinions of the Commonwealth Court seem to 
indicate that it is having second thoughts about the scope of the 
Reider holding.  Thus, in Murgerson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of 
Probation and Parole, 579 A.2d 1335, 1336 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990), the Court commented that because the imposition of 
conditions is a part of the parole decision, "consistent with the 
rationale in Reider we hold that the imposition of such 
conditions is not subject to judicial review absent an allegation 
that the condition violates a prisoner's constitutional rights."  
(emphasis added).  See also McCaskill v. Pennsylvania Bd. of 
Probation and Parole, 631 A.2d 1092, 1094 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1993) (judicial review of Parole Board's order includes 
determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, 
citing 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  704).   
         Other cases, however, are consistent with Reider.  SeeShaw v. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 671 A.2d 290, 
292 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (allegations of due process and equal 
protection violations do not establish "liberty interest" and 
claims unreviewable); King v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and 
Parole, 534 A.2d 150, 151 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (retaliatory 
denial not reviewable); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation 
and Parole, 532 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (due process 
contention not reviewable).  
         Reider was correct in its conclusion that no liberty 
interest is created by the expectation of parole.  SeeGreenholtz, 442 U.S. 
at 11.  But Reider is seriously flawed 
because it fails to recognize that the curtailment of a liberty 
interest is not the only way that the Constitution may be 
violated.   
         The Supreme Court held in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 597 (1972), that although a person may have no "right" to a 
valuable government benefit, and may be denied it for any number 
of reasons, "there are some reasons upon which the government may 
not rely."  We applied that principle in Block v. Potter, 631 
F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980), where we explained "[a]lthough 
Greenholtz indicates that a state may . . . deny it completely, a 
state statute may not sanction totally arbitrary parole decisions 
founded on impermissible criteria."  Moreover, "[a] legislative 
grant of discretion does not amount to a license for arbitrary 
behavior."  Id.   
         In Block, the Parole Board used race as one of the 
bases for denying parole.  The panel majority concluded that in 
so doing, the agency violated substantive due process in 
grounding its action on "constitutionally impermissible reasons."  
Id. at 236.  The panel also concluded that the denial of parole 
violated the prisoner's right to equal protection.  "The equal 
protection clause forbids government bodies from making decisions 
on the basis of race, even if other factors were also 
considered."  Id. at 241.   
         The dissenting judge in Block disagreed with the 
majority's finding of a liberty interest and declined to read 
Greenholtz as applicable to both substantive as well as 
procedural due process.  However, the dissent concurred with the 
majority's position on equal protection and said that a 
discretionary parole system "does not give the state the 
unfettered right to deny parole on arbitrary and impermissible 
grounds."  Id. at 244.  
         Cases in other Courts of Appeals have been in agreement 
with Block's premise.  See Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 
870 (10th Cir. 1981) (denial of parole because prisoner was 
Hispanic states claim for violation of equal protection); Osborne 
v. Folmar, 735 F.2d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (prisoner may 
challenge parole decisions on equal protection grounds even 
though he fails to establish due process claim).   
         Case law has also established that a state may not bar 
parole in retaliation for a prisoner's exercise of his 
constitutional rights.  See Shabazz v. Askins, 980 F.2d 1333 
(10th Cir. 1992) (retaliation for a prisoner's religious 
discrimination suits against prison officials); Clark v. Georgia 
Pardons and Paroles Board, 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(retaliation for filing suit against prison officials for 
wrongful death of prisoner's brother).  See also Cain v. Lane, 
857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988) (retaliation for exercise of 
First Amendment rights).   
         Several Courts of Appeals have addressed analogous 
retaliation claims in the prison setting, although not involving 
parole decisions.  Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 
1986), noted that the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine 
applies in prisoner section 1983 cases.  Accord Woods v. Edwards, 
51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995) ("It is settled that prison 
officials cannot act against a prisoner for availing himself of 
the courts and attempting to defend his constitutional rights").  
         In Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986), 
the complaint alleged threats made by a prison guard in 
retaliation for testimony given by the inmate in another case.  
These facts supported a section 1983 claim for violation of the 
prisoner's "due-process and First Amendment right of access to 
the federal courts."  Id. at 100.  Accord Newsom v. Norris, 888 
F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1989). 
         Similarly, Burkett's claim that he was denied release 
on parole based on the exercise of his right of access to the 
courts alleges an impermissible and unconstitutional reason for 
the Board's action.  That claim is not based on the abrogation of 
a liberty interest, and consequently, is not within the ambit of 
the reasoning underlying the decision in Reider.  It is at least 
arguable, therefore, that Burkett's claim is not controlled by 
Reider.  However, the application of that case to other instances 
of constitutional violations shows that the Commonwealth Court 
has given the holding a broad sweep.  
         It is important, therefore, to assess the attitude of 
the state's highest court.  In discussing the right of appeal in 
parole cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bronson explained 
that the state's constitution guarantees the right to an appeal 
from an administrative agency (including the Pennsylvania Parole 
Board) to a court.  421 A.2d at 1024-25.  Implementing 
legislation designated the Commonwealth Court as the appropriate 
court of record for agency review.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
763.  Bronson concluded that the Commonwealth Court had 
jurisdiction over the appeal from a parole revocation decision 
made by the Board.  421 A.2d at 1025-26.  In its opinion, the 
state Supreme Court did not indicate in any way that Commonwealth 
Court would lack jurisdiction if the controversy had centered on 
denial, rather than revocation, of parole.   
         As we read Bronson, therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction over appeals 
from a denial of parole based on constitutional grounds other 
than an alleged abrogation of a liberty interest.  To that 
extent, we conclude that Reider does not state the law in 
Pennsylvania and that Burkett was entitled to appeal to the 
Commonwealth Court.   
         One other procedural avenue appears open to Burkett.  
Reider itself acknowledged that "mandamus is available to compel 
the Board to conduct a hearing or correct a mistake in applying 
the law."  514 A.2d at 972 n.4.  In Commonwealth ex rel. 
Saltzburg v. Fulcomer, 555 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), the 
Superior Court noted a distinction between an appeal from a 
"discretionary decision" of the Board and an action that seeks to 
compel the Board to act in accordance with its own regulations.  
In the latter circumstance, the Superior Court held that mandamus 
was the appropriate remedy and transferred an appeal from a Board 
ruling to the Commonwealth Court.  Id. at 914.   
         We also consider whether Burkett may be able to proceed 
in the state courts under the Post Conviction Relief Act or by 
requesting a writ of habeas corpus.  In 1988, Pennsylvania 
enacted the Post Conviction Relief Act.  It provides "the sole 
means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other 
common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . 
including habeas corpus and coram nobis."  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann.  9542. 
         In Commonwealth v. Hayes, 596 A.2d 195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991), the Superior Court held that the language of the Post 
Conviction Relief Act precluded resort to the writ of coram 
nobis.  No appellate court in Pennsylvania, to our knowledge, has 
considered the question of whether the Act has totally replaced 
the writ of habeas corpus.  We note, however, that the 
Pennsylvania Constitution art. I,  14 provides that the writ of 
habeas corpus may not be suspended unless rebellion or public 
safety may require it. 
         The Post Conviction Relief Act, moreover, is limited to 
persons who assert they were convicted of crimes they did not 
commit and persons who are serving illegal sentences.  42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann.  9542.  Petitioner here does not fall into 
either of those categories.  Instead, he alleges that he is 
unjustly incarcerated because of an unconstitutional denial of 
parole.  He does not deny commission of the crime, nor in this 
petition does he contend that the sentence is illegal.   
         The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
the effect of the Act on habeas corpus, and so we are required to 
predict what its ruling would be.  Because of the state 
constitutional provisions prohibiting impairment of the right to 
a writ of habeas corpus, we would expect that in the event that 
the Commonwealth Court cannot adjudicate this matter, the state's 
highest court would permit a habeas corpus action in the 
circumstances present here.  Alternatively, we predict that the 
state's highest court would conclude that the petition here is 
outside the scope of the Post Conviction Relief Act.   
         In Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, 1291 (Pa. 
1983) (challenging Bureau of Corrections' interpretation of term 
of incarceration), the state Supreme Court held that where a 
prisoner did not mount a "direct or collateral attack on the 
conviction or sentence imposed by the trial court," the proper 
remedy was not under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (the 
predecessor statute), and "[c]onsequently, appellant may resort 
to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum."  Id.  Similarly, 
in Commonwealth v. Maute, 397 A.2d 826, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1979), the Superior Court held that "[a] claim for `cruel and 
unusual punishment' is more properly cognizable in a petition for 
habeas corpus" than under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. 
         Those two cases were decided before the Post Conviction 
Relief Act was enacted, but we believe the reasoning in those 
opinions is sound and applicable to the current statute.  It 
follows that claims of unconstitutional violations not seeking to 
set aside a sentence or a conviction are outside the Post 
Conviction Relief Act.   
         We read Isabell, 467 A.2d at 1291, as permitting a 
petition for habeas corpus relief in the circumstances here 
because Burkett is not making a direct or collateral attack on 
his conviction or sentence.  We recognize that in 1944, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a parole denial could not 
be challenged by using a petition for habeas corpus to allege 
that the Board had been neither fair nor impartial.  SeeCommonwealth ex 
rel. Biglow v. Ashe, 35 A.2d 340 (Pa. 1944).  
There was no charge of unconstitutional action in that case and 
we need not resolve the conflict (if any) between it and Isabell.  
Fundamentally, it is the role of the Pennsylvania courts to 
clarify the law of that state.  It is enough for our purposes to 
note that, should the Commonwealth Court not have jurisdiction, 
either by appeal or mandamus, relief by habeas corpus has not 
been foreclosed by holdings of the state Supreme Court.   
         It appears to us, therefore, that Burkett has available 
three potential ways of attacking the denial of parole in 
Pennsylvania courts  -- appeal, mandamus, or habeas corpus.  The 
somewhat unsettled state law in this area is a factor to consider 
in deciding whether we should proceed to the merits, rather than 
requiring Burkett to exhaust state remedies.  Obviously, a ruling 
by the state Supreme Court or Commonwealth Court discussing the 
scope of the Reider opinion and the proper channels for bringing 
such claims would be helpful in this frequently litigated area of 
state law.   
         Clarification is highly desirable and counsels in favor 
of exhaustion of state remedies rather than resolution on the 
merits in the first instance by the district court.  Failure to 
require resort to the state courts in these circumstances would 
not be consistent with a sound exercise of discretion.  Moreover, 
we find some gaps in the record, such as the absence of the 
letters written to the Parole Board by the sentencing judge and 
the district attorney, that make us hesitant to address the 
merits of Burkett's petition at this stage. 
         We emphasize that our holding does not express any view 
as to the validity of Burkett's claim.  We merely recognize that 
an allegation that parole was denied in retaliation for the 
successful exercise of the right of access to the courts states a 
cognizable claim for relief. 
         Pennsylvania law provides that the Parole Board "shall, 
in all cases, consider" recommendations from district attorneys 
and sentencing judges, 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  331.19, while 
retaining "exclusive power to parole."  61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
 331.17.  The mere fact that recommendations were submitted to 
the Board is not enough, in itself, to establish Burkett's claim.  
He must show more.  The determination of whether there was any 
retaliation, and whether that retaliation influenced the decision 
of the Parole Board, is a matter that must be addressed by the 
state courts. 
         Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district 
court with instructions to dismiss the petition so that Burkett 









                                  
 
 




STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
          I concur in the judgment of the court.  For the reasons 
stated by the court and the dissent in Reider, I predict that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that the Commonwealth 
Court has jurisdiction to entertain Burkett's claim.  I am unable 
to join the opinion of the court, however, because I think any 
other avenue to relief for Burkett is barred by authoritative 
precedent.  As the court properly concludes, the Post Conviction 
Relief Act is not applicable.  In addition, under current 
Pennsylvania law, Burkett cannot seek review of a parole denial 
in a state habeas corpus or mandamus proceeding.   
